

W. Scott Oxenford Columbia Generating Station P.O. Box 968, PE08 Richland, WA 99352-0968 Ph. 509.377.4300 | F. 509.377.4150 soxenford@energy-northwest.com

January 4, 2010 GO2-10-001

10 CFR 50.73

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Subject:

COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION, DOCKET NO. 50-397

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 2009-005-00

Dear Sir or Madam:

Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No. 2009-005-00 for Columbia Generating Station. This report is submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). The enclosed report discusses items of reportability and corrective actions taken related to a manual reactor scram that occurred on November 7, 2009.

There are no commitments being made to the NRC herein. If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. MC Humphreys at (509) 377-4025.

Respectfully,

WS Oxenford

Vice President, Nuclear Generation & Chief Nuclear Officer

Enclosure: Licensee Event Report 2009-005-00

cc: EE Collins, Jr. - NRC RIV

CF Lyon – NRC NRR

INPO Records Center

NRC Sr. Resident Inspector – 988C (2)

RN Sherman – BPA/1399

WA Horin - Winston & Strawn

WC Walker - NRC RIV/fax

I EDZ NRA

(9-2007) APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 08/31/2010 Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fee back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202 (3150-0104) Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose a not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection. 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. PAGE											ection request: process and fed process and fe					
Columbia Generating Station							05000397				1 OF 4					
4. TITLE							333333									
Manual Reactor Scram due to Main Turbine DEH Control System Fluid Leak																
	5. EVENT DATE			6. LER NUMBER			7. REPORT DATE				8. OTHER FACILITIES I				SINVOL	VED
MONTH	DAY	YEA	R YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	MÖN	ГН	DAY	YEAR	FAC	CILITY	NAME		,		KET NUMBER
11	07	200	9 200	09 – 005 –	00	01		04	2010	FAC	CILITY	NAME				KET NUMBER
						·									05	5000
9. OPERATI 1 10. POWER 52		DE	☐ 20.2: ☐ 20.2: ☐ 20.2: ☐ 20.2: ☐ 20.2: ☐ 20.2: ☐ 20.2:	HIS REPORT (201(b) (201(d) (203(a)(2)(i) (203(a)(2)(ii) (203(a)(2)(iii) (203(a)(2)(iv) (203(a)(2)(v) (203(a)(2)(v) (203(a)(2)(v)		20.220 20.220 20.220 50.360 50.360 50.460 50.730	D3(a)(3 D3(a)(4 (c)(1)(i (c)(1)(i (c)(2) (a)(3)(i (a)(2)(i (a)(2)(i	3)(i) 3)(ii) 4) (A) i)(A) ii)(A) ii)(A)		50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50).73(a)(;).73(a)(;).73(a)(;).73(a)(;).73(a)(;).73(a)(;).73(a)(;	2)(i)(C) 2)(ii)(A) 2)(ii)(B)			50.73(a)(; 50.73(a)(; 50.73(a)(; 50.73(a)(; 50.73(a)(; 73.71(a)(; 73.71(a)(; DTHER Specify in	2)(vii) 2)(viii)(A) 2)(viii)(B) 2)(ix)(A) 2)(x) 4)
FACILITY N	AMF				IZ. LICE	NSEE CO	NIAC	1 FOH	INISL	EH	TE	LEPHO	NE NUI	MBER	(Include	Area Code)
FACILITY NAME Donald W. Gregoire, Engineering Specialist TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) 509-377-8616																
			13. COMPLE	TE ONE LINE				VT FAI	LURE D	ESCR	RIBED	N THIS	REPOR			
CAUSE	SYSTE	M	COMPONENT	MANU- FACTURER	3	PORTABLE TO EPIX		CA	USE	SYS	STEM	COMF	PONENT		ANU- TURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX
D	JJ		ACC	S477	N										,	
14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)							⊠	NO		15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE			MON.	TH	DAY	YEAR
DATE -																

ABSTRACT

On November 7, 2009, the control room staff had completed a scheduled downpower of Columbia Generating Station to perform maintenance activities. After reaching the targeted power level, a rapid loss of hydraulic fluid from the main turbine digital electro-hydraulic control (DEH) system occurred. This resulted in the initiation of a manual scram of the reactor as directed by plant procedures at 0725. This event meets the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for manual actuation of a system described in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(1).

The direct cause for the loss of hydraulic fluid was the failure of an o-ring at the lower mounting block flange of accumulator DEH-TK-1D. This flange was determined to be incorrectly assembled following preventive maintenance performed during the previous refueling outage. The root cause was determined to be that the administrative requirements associated with maintenance on the DEH Accumulators did not impose special verifications, controls, or personal accountability measures to ensure that maintenance is performed appropriately.

The affected flange was reassembled with a new o-ring and bolts torqued to recommended values. This event did not adversely affect the health and safety of the public.

(9-2007)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) CONTINUATION SHEET

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET		6. LER NUMBER	3. PAGE		
Columbia Generating Station	05000397	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	2 OF 4	
Columbia Generaling Station		20	009 - 005 - 0	2 OF 4		

Plant Condition

The plant was in mode 1 operating at 52% power.

Event Description

On November 7, 2009, the control room staff had completed a scheduled downpower of Columbia Generating Station (Columbia) to perform turbine governor valve [FCV] testing and other maintenance activities. After reaching the targeted power level, a rapid loss of hydraulic fluid from the main turbine digital electro-hydraulic (DEH) control system [TG] occurred. A DEH reservoir [RVR] low level alarm was received in the control room at 0718. Subsequently, a low-low level alarm was received at 0724. At 0725, the reactor was manually scrammed as required by plant procedures.

All rods fully inserted as expected in response to the manual RPS actuation and heat removal through the main condenser [SG] was maintained. Following the scram, a reactor water level 3 isolation occurred. Post trip reactor vessel water level was restored and maintained in the normal band using the feedwater [SJ] and condensate systems [SD]. Pressure was controlled in the normal band using the main steam line drains. No other safety systems actuated or were required to actuate. There was no inoperable equipment at the start of the event that contributed to the event. Off-site power was available and all three emergency diesel generators [EK] were operable and available.

Reference Event Notification #45484 for initial reporting of this event.

Causes

The direct cause for the loss of hydraulic fluid was the failure of an o-ring at the lower mounting block flange of DEH accumulator DEH-TK-1D [ACC]. This flange was determined to have been incorrectly assembled following preventative maintenance that replaced the o-ring during the previous refueling outage. Two of the four flange bolts were found to be loose and torqued improperly. The opportunity to identify this latent condition was missed when an oil leak in the general area of the accumulator was reported by an equipment operator approximately a month and a half prior to the event. However, the leak was wiped up prior to Maintenance investigation of the leak, giving the impression that there was no equipment problem when Maintenance personnel inspected the location.

The root cause for the incorrect assembly of the block flange was determined to be that the administrative requirements associated with maintenance on the DEH accumulators did not impose special verifications, controls, or personal accountability measures to ensure that maintenance was performed appropriately, even though portions of the pressure boundary are a single point vulnerability for a turbine trip.

NRC FORM 366A **U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION** (9-2007)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) CONTINUATION SHEET 2. DOCKET 1. FACILITY NAME 6. LER NUMBER 3. PAGE SEQUENTIAL **REV** YEAR NUMBER NO. Columbia Generating Station 05000397 3 OF 4 2009 - 005 - 00

Contributing causes include:

- 1. Energy Northwest supervision provided inadequate oversight to verify the quality of field work and failed to monitor and reinforce expectations for performing work.
- 2. There was no post maintenance test (PMT) performed on the DEH fluid side of the pressure boundary after the flange was reassembled.
- Less than adequate decision making caused the work request that identified an oil leak on the accumulator issued a month and a half previous to the event to be closed based on a decision to accept DEH pressure boundary leakage as is.
- 4. The root cause evaluation for the failure of a DEH Swagelok fitting that occurred in August of 2008 failed to include other pressure boundary fittings in the extent of condition.

Corrective Actions Taken or Planned

Immediate corrective actions include:

- The DEH-TK-1D o-ring was replaced and satisfactorily passed the PMT leak check.
- An extent of condition and technical evaluation were performed to provide a reasonable assurance of system functionality and reliability prior to plant startup. Startup was approved by the Plant Operations Committee based on this information.

Interim corrective actions include:

- Operations issued a night order to ensure condition reports and work requests are generated for all existing oil leaks.
- Operations issued a night order to establish the expectation that in the future when operators wipe
 up oil that they ensure a condition report, work request, and deficiency tag have been established
 for the leak. The Shift Manager is to ensure that all oil leaks have been identified.

Corrective actions to prevent recurrence include:

Identify locations/joints that have experienced leaks or are of concern and perform a DEH
hydraulics pressure boundary review of threaded and flanged mechanical joints on the high
pressure and trip header/components. Based on vendor or industry guidance identify appropriate
torque values for bolted connections and appropriate additional test/inspection requirements
that should be used to validate joint pressure boundary reliability for both threaded and bolted
connections. Provide information to Maintenance for inclusion into model work orders.

- Establish in work instructions for DEH hydraulic high pressure and trip header components:
 - parts verification inspections sign off steps, and
 - quality control or peer verification sign off steps for steps that apply test/inspection criteria that validate mechanical joint pressure boundary integrity.
- Revise DEH hydraulic fluid component model work orders with the criteria and expectations developed in the first two corrective actions above.
- Identify required specifications for DEH-TK-1A through 1F o-ring application, including hardness, and provide critical characteristics information to Maintenance.
- Verify specifications of currently installed materials based on work history and generate condition reports for installed o-rings that do not meet required specifications. Identify critical characteristics for purchase of new o-rings and revise the bill of materials as necessary to include o-rings that meet specifications.
- Identify other high risk/consequence systems for a pressure boundary event and other at risk bolted connections, and perform a risk evaluation to determine which systems should have additional risk mitigation methods similar to the second corrective action above. Define appropriate risk mitigation method(s) for each system determined to be risk significant, and generate additional corrective actions to track completion.
- Evaluate personnel performance against performance gaps identified in the barrier, failure mode, and cause and effect analysis. Address individual personnel accountability issues via individual performance improvement initiatives.

Other corrective actions for addressing contributing causes have also been established that were not included in this report.

Assessment of Safety Consequences

This event did not involve an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of any safety function described in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v). This event does not qualify as a reactor scram with complications; all safety systems performed as designed, and therefore, this event posed no threat to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

Similar Events

A similar event occurred at Columbia on August 21, 2008 (reference LER 2008-001) in which a Swagelok compression fitting failed, resulting in a loss of DEH fluid. However, in contrast, the event that occurred on August 21, 2008 involved an immediate drop in DEH system trip header pressure below the reactor protection system trip setpoint resulting in an automatic initiation of a reactor scram.

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) Information

EIIS codes are bracketed [] where applicable in the narrative.